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Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production 
activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect 
corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce 
less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-
systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour. 
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1. Motivation and Survey of the Literature 
Economies  characterised  by  a  great  extent  of  corruption  are  argued  to  be  plagued  by 
substantial tax evasion activities as well (Tanzi and Davoodi 2001). Since corruption and tax 
evasion  are,  by  nature,  difficult  to  measure,  the  empirical  evidence  for  an  according 
relationship  is  scarce.  However,  with  the  exception  of  fiscal  corruption,  there  are  also 
relatively few theoretical investigations. Chu (1990) and Bowles (1999), for example, find 
that  corruption  among  tax  enforcement  agents  increases  income  tax  evasion  since  the 
effective penalty declines, providing a theoretical argument for a positive link between tax 
evasion and corruption. Sanyal (2000, 2002), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Besley and McLaren 
(1993) investigate the impact of alternative reward schemes on the behaviour of corrupt tax 
officials and the level of corruption. In addition, Chander and Wilde (1992) and Sanyal et al. 
(2000) show that tax revenues may decline with the income tax rate in the presence of corrupt 
tax officials. Since tax evasion entails corruption, this 'Laffer-curve' effect is also compatible 
with a positive relation between the two illegal activities. 
While fiscal corruption establishes a direct impact of corruption on tax evasion, corruptive 
behaviour can also have an indirect effect. First, in a society in which individual behaviour is 
influenced by social norms, these norms may apply equally to tax evasion and corruption. 
Second, if tax evasion is only feasible for income generated unofficially and, in addition, 
activities in the shadow economy require bribing government employees, corruption and tax 
evasion  are  positively  correlated.  Third,  the  incentives  to  evade  taxes  may  be  altered  if 
corruption is feasible, and vice versa. This list of linkages between tax evasion and corruption 
is certainly not exhaustive. However, it suggests that corruption among tax officials is not the 
only feasible connection between the two illegal activities. Ascertaining the existence of such 
a link and also its details  can  be important for  a number of reasons: first, since evasion 
reduces tax revenues and, thereby, the supply of public goods, a positive association between 
corruption and tax evasion will further question the "efficient grease hypothesis" (Kaufmann 
and Wei 1999) according to which corruption can enhance the efficiency of an economy 
strangled  by  excessive  government  regulation.  Second,  a  positive  relationship  between 
evasion  and  corruption  can  provide  an  additional  explanation  for  the  observation  that 
countries with higher levels of corruption collect fewer taxes per unit of GDP than those with   2 
less corruption.
1 Finally, any correlation between evasion and corruption will alter the optimal 
amount of resources spent on combating these types of illegal behaviour. 
The present paper investigates one particular mechanism by which corporate tax evasion and 
corruption can be related. It looks at the respective linkage in a setting in which firms can 
evade a tax on profits and purchase production licences illegally. By focussing on firms, 
issues of risk-aversion can be averted. Hence, the analysis does not have to rely on viewing 
tax evasion as a gamble which requires implausibly high measures of risk-aversion to explain 
observed (individual) tax evasion behaviour (Alm 1999). The gains from corruption consist in 
a lower expenditure for legally acquiring production licences. Tax evasion and corruption are, 
therefore, related insofar as that substituting corruption expenses for expenditure caused by 
legal actions can alter the costs of evading taxes.  
Section 2 sets out the basic model. The analysis shows that tax evasion does not affect input 
and corruption choices. Moreover, input decisions do not alter tax evasion either. Therefore, 
the well-established two-directional independence of production and tax evasion choices also 
holds in the presence of corruption activities. However, changes in exogenous variables which 
affect corruption also have an impact on tax evasion. Section 3 accordingly analyses for the 
basic  model  whether  the  existence  of  tax  evasion  indirectly  affects  corruption.  Section  4 
inquires  whether  and  how  policies  that  alter  corruption  affect  tax  evasion  behaviour  and 
whether a positive correlation - as suggested by the links discussed above - can be established. 
In Section 5, two extensions of the basic model are looked at to investigate the robustness of 




The production sector of the economy can be represented by a fixed number of identical 
firms. Each firm uses one factor k, which is subsequently labelled 'capital' for simplicity, in 
order  to  produce  the  quantity  f  of  a  homogeneous  good,  where  f(k)  depicts  the  strictly 
concave production function, f ' > 0, f '' < 0, f '(0) ￿ ￿. Output  sells at a unit price. As a 
complement  to  capital,  production  requires  a  number  p  of  what  we  will  call  permits  or 
production  licences.  Permits  can  be  thought  of  as  certificates  provided  by  government 
agencies  which  state  that  health,  safety,  sanitary  and  fire  regulations,  environmental 
                                                
1 See Johnson et al. (1999) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1998, 2001) for according evidence. Friedman et al. (2000) 
do not find such a link.   3 
requirements, workplace rules or certification measures have been fulfilled. In a wider sense, 
permits  may  also  represent  the  bureaucratic  requirements  which  firms  have  to  fulfil  by 
reporting information to statistical offices, the tax authority or social security institutions, 
local government agencies or a government agency attempting to prevent discrimination of 
minorities. The decisive feature of these permits is that they are a prerequisite for production, 
raise the costs of firms and can potentially be obtained illegally by bribing the government 
official in charge of granting them. The existence of regulatory requirements as captured by 
the concept of 'permits' generates the possibility for bureaucratic corruption.
2 The number of 
permits p required represents the extent of regulation in the economy and increases with the 
amount of capital, p = p(k), p'(k) > 0. Moreover, p(0) = p'(0) = 0 and p''(k) ￿ 0 are presumed. 
The  convex  relationship  between  p  and  k  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  regulatory 
requirements for larger firms are more extensive than according rules for smaller companies. 
This can be an adequate assumption as small and medium-sized firms are often exempted, for 
example, from some environmental, sanitary or safety requirements and labour standards.
3  
Production can only take place if a firm owns the required number of permits, irrespective of 
whether they have been acquired in accordance with the law or have been bought illegally. 
This assumption reflects the insight that it is easily observable whether a firm possesses the 
number of required certificates or permits and that it will immediately be closed down if 
permits are missing. However, it is much more difficult to ascertain whether all permits have 
been obtained legally. Obtaining permits is costly for the firm either because it uses resources 
to warrant the safety, health, workplace and environmental standards which are required to 
legally obtain certificates, or because attaining the permits illegally implies purchasing them 
from corrupt bureaucrats. If the firm obtains all the required permits legally, this will cost 
C(p(k)). The cost function C is strictly convex, implying C'(p(k)), C''(p(k)) > 0 for p(k) > 0, 
and  warrants  C(0)  =  C'(0)  =  0.  The  costs  of  fulfilling  the  regulatory  requirement  in  the 
presence  of  corruption  amount  to  C(p(k) – x) + bx,  where  x  is  the  number  of  permits 
purchased illegally. The price b of procuring a permit illegally can include bribe payments to 
corrupt  government  employees,  the  penalty  if  caught,  and  the  costs  of  hiding  corruption 
activities. For simplicity, expected costs b per permit acquired illegally are referred to as 
                                                
2 This notion of corruption is akin to Shleifer and Vishny's (1993, p. 599) perception: "We define government 
corruption  as  the  sale  by  government  officials  of  government  property  for  personal  gain.  For  example, 
government officials often collect bribes for providing permits and licences, … . Licences, permits, passports 
and visas are needed to comply with laws and regulations that restrict private economic activity."  
3 So-called threshold values pertaining to labour standards are one prominent example of regulations which 
become more extensive for larger firms. Dietrich and Junker (2003) document about 160 threshold levels in 
German labour law.    4 
'bribes'  and  assumed  to  be  constant.  The  number  of  permits  x  acquired  illegally  will 
subsequently be interpreted as the extent of corruptive activities. 
The assumptions on the functions p(k) and C(p(k)) ensure ￿C/￿k > 0 and ￿2C/￿k2 = C''(p')2 + 
C'p'' > 0 and, hence, that the total costs of fulfilling the regulatory requirement increase at an 
increasing rate with capital. If, in contrast, the costs C(p(k)) of obtaining permits legally were 
concave in k, the incentives to obtain them legally would rise with firm size. Hence, large 
firms would be less likely to engage in corruptive behaviour. Since there is no evidence on the 
exact curvature of C, it is assumed that the sufficient condition for corruption to exist in 
equilibrium is warranted. Moreover, while the number p(k) of permits required and their costs 
C(p(k)) are likely to exhibit discontinuities, as usual in the analysis of variables which are not 
varied marginally in reality, in the model infinitesimal changes are assumed to be feasible. 
Capital can be bought at a price r per unit. Thus, profits in the absence of taxes and corruption 
are R(k) – C(p(k)), where R(k) := f(k) – rk, denoted as net revenues, has been substituted for 
notational convenience, so that R'(k) > - r, R''(k) < 0 for k > 0, R(0) = 0 and R'(0) ￿ ￿. Firms 
have to pay a proportional tax τ on profits but can evade taxes by under-declaring their gross 
profits R(k) - C(p(k) – x) - bx. Let h, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, be the share of gross profits declared to tax 
authorities. The optimal declaration h* depends, inter alia, on the tax treatment of bribes, via 
its impact on the costs of evasion. The parameter α, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, measures the fraction of the 
expenditure bx for purchasing permits illegally which is tax deductible. Even if bribes are not 
tax deductible, as the OECD already suggested in 1996, bribe-related costs which also arise in 
the course of legal transactions may be fully deductible. Accordingly, a positive value of the 
parameter α represents a reasonable hypothesis and the tax base then equals R(k) – C(p(k) – 
x) – ￿bx. 
The costs K of tax evasion may, inter alia, be determined by the extent of tax evasion, the 
probability of being detected and fined for evasion, the magnitude of penalties and the costs 
of audits and tax advisors. For simplicity, the strictly convex 'cost of evasion' function K, K', 
K'' > 0, is presumed to depend on unpaid taxes ￿[R(k) – C(p(k) – x) - ￿bx] - ￿h[R(k) – C(p(k) 
– x) - bx] only.
4 Using all of the above assumptions, after-tax profits π can be expressed as: 
( ) ) h ( bx ) h 1 )]( x ) k ( p ( C ) k ( R [ K ] bx ) x ) k ( p ( C ) k ( R )[ h 1 ( ) h , x , k ( − α τ − − − − τ − − − − τ − = π  (1) 
                                                
4 If K depends on undeclared profits, the only effect of this modification will be that a higher tax rate has an 
ambiguous impact on the level of evasion, while tax evasion will decline if K is a function of unpaid taxes, as 
assumed above. This finding for income taxes (cf. Yitzhaki 1974) carries over to profit taxation for convex costs 
of evasion.    5 
2.2 Optimal Choices 
The first-order conditions for the maximisation of after-tax profits ￿ are: 
0 )) ( ' p ) ( ' C ) ( ' R ))( h 1 ( ) ( ' K h 1 (
k
= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − τ ⋅ − τ − =
∂
π ∂
       (2a) 
0 )] h ( b ) ( ' C ) h 1 [( ) ( ' K ) b ) ( ' C )( h 1 (
x
= − α − ⋅ − τ ⋅ − − ⋅ τ − =
∂
π ∂
     (2b) 
[] 0 bx ) ( C ) ( R )) ( ' K 1 (
h
= − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + − =
∂
π ∂
     (2c) 
The expression in square brackets in (2c) is positive, since otherwise after-tax profits ￿ would 
be negative. Thus, an interior solution to the tax evasion problem, 0 < h* < 1, implies:  
( ) 0 ] ) h ( bx ) h 1 )]( x ) k ( p ( C ) k ( R [ [ ' K 1 : h = − α − − − − τ + − = π      (2c') 
Using (2c') in (2a) and (2b) yields: 
0 ) k ( ' p ) x ) k ( p ( ' C ) k ( ' R : k = − − = π       (2a') 
0 ) 1 ( b ) x ) k ( p ( ' C ) 1 ( : x = ατ − − − τ − = π        (2b') 
An inspection of equations (2a') and (2b') shows that the optimal choices of capital input  
k*  >  0  and  permits  x*  >  0  acquired  illegally  are  independent  of  tax  evasion.  Since  the 
parameter ￿ never exceeds unity, the increase in gross profits C'(.) of illegally purchasing an 
additional permit will generally be larger than the net-of-tax costs b of doing so (C'(.) ￿ b). 
While  it  has  implicitly  been  assumed  so  far  that  the  number  of  permits  required  is  an 
increasing function of inputs, the regulatory requirement may also be related to output f(k). In 
such a setting, the costs of acquiring permits would equal C(p(f(k)) - x) and profits be given 
by: 
] bx ) x )) k ( f ( p ( C rk ) k ( f )[ h 1 ( ) h , x , k ( # − − − − τ − = π          
( ) ) h ( bx ) h 1 )]( x )) k ( f ( p ( C rk ) k ( f [ K − α τ − − − − − τ −  (1#) 
Maximising ￿# with respect to k, x, and h and rearranging yields (2a') to (2c') as first-order 
conditions, given C = C(p(f(k)) - x). Therefore, the subsequent results will also apply if the 
regulatory  requirement  is  related  to  the  firm's  output  -  instead  of  its  inputs  k -   and  the 
functions p(k) and C(p(f(k)) are sufficiently convex to ensure an interior profit maximum.   6 
Totally differentiating (2a') to (2c') for C(p(k) - x) with respect to the endogenous variables k, 
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Subsequently,  arguments  of  the  functions  R,  K  and  p  will  be  omitted  for  notational 
convenience. Since ￿kx = C''p' > 0, ￿xx = - C''(1 - ￿) = -￿xk/p' < 0, and ￿kk, ￿hh < 0, the 
optimal choices k*, x*, and h* constitute a unique after-tax profit maximum (see Appendix 
1). For later use it is helpful to note that ￿hx = K''￿(C'(1 - h) - (￿ - h)b) ￿ 0, as C' ￿ b and ￿ ￿ 
1, and D := ￿hh(￿kk￿xx - ￿xk￿kx) < 0. 
 
3. Impact of Tax Evasion on Corruption 
The analysis of Section 2 has clarified that tax evasion, corruption, and input choices are 
separable to some extent. Therefore, it is possible to make statements about the impact of tax 
evasion on corruption (in this section) directly. However, since tax evasion and corruption are 
both determined endogenously, the impact of variations in exogenous parameters can shed 
more light on the correlation between evasion and corruption and is looked at in the next 
section. The effects of tax evasion on corruption and capital input choices are summarised in: 
Proposition 1 
(1)  A  firm  uses  the  same  amount  of  capital  and  purchases  the  same  number  of  permits 
illegally, irrespective of the extent of tax evasion.   
(2) The impact of anti-corruption policies on optimal corruption and capital input choices is 
unaffected by tax evasion activities.  
Proof: Optimal choices of capital and permits purchased illegally are determined by equations 
(2a') and (2b'). Neither of these equations depends on the optimal fraction h* of the tax base 
declared to tax authorities, proving part (1) of the Proposition. Moreover, the consequences of 
changes in any exogenous variable ￿ on capital and corruption choices are given by: 
xk kx xx kk
xx k x kx
d
dk
π π − π π
π θ π − θ π π
=
θ
       (4a) 
xk kx xx kk
kk x k xk
d
dx
π π − π π
π θ π − θ π π
=
θ
       (4b)   7 
Since none of the derivatives contained in equations (4) is affected by a variation in h* (cf. 
equations (2a'), (2c'), and the calculations subsequent to (3)), the variations in capital input 
and corruption due to changes in exogenous variables aimed at combating corruption will be 
unaffected by tax evasion. This proves part (2) of the Proposition. ￿ 
Remarks 
Equations (2a') to (2c') illustrate that capital and corruption choices are independent of the 
level of tax evasion. In addition, any policy which alters the gains and costs of corruption will 
not be affected by the existence and extent of tax evasion. This is because even though anti-
corruption policies may affect tax evasion - an issue to be looked at in the next section - there 
are no repercussions on capital and corruption via a change in evasion activities. Moreover, 
capital  choices  do  not  alter  optimal  evasion  decisions,  that  is,  capital  input  and  evasion 
choices  are  entirely  separable,  for  a  given  amount  of  corruption.
5  This  two-directional 
independence arises because the marginal costs of tax evasion are unrelated to the level of 
capital input, given optimal capital choices, as ￿K'/￿k* = 0. The independence of corruption 
from optimal evasion choices holds irrespective of the tax treatment of bribes. This is the case 
as the marginal costs of evasion due to lower tax base declarations (￿K/￿h*) are independent 
of the extent of tax deductibility of bribes. Solely the level of evasion costs declines with the 
measure of tax deductibility ￿.  
According to Proposition 1 there is no impact of tax evasion on corruption, for given levels of 
other variables. However, if tax rates are the same in an economy with tax evasion and in 
another  without  evasion  activities,  so  that  capital  and  corruption  choices  coincide,  tax 
revenues per firm will be less in the economy characterised by evasion. Suppose that the 
government in this economy increases the tax rate ￿ to a level so that the effective tax rate ￿h* 
matches the (effective) tax rate ￿ in the economy without evasion. The impact of tax evasion 
on economic activity is summarised in: 
Proposition 2 
If revenue losses due to tax evasion are compensated by higher tax rates and if bribes are not 
completely tax deductible, tax evasion will reduce capital input and corruption. 
Proof: As capital input and corruption are independent of evasion, the capital and corruption 
effects of imposing the same effective tax rate on firms in an economy with evasion as in an 
economy without such behaviour are solely due to the increase in the tax rate. The impact of 
                                                
5 For according results and also exceptions see Yaniv (1995, 1996), Lee (1998), and Panteghini (2000), inter alia.   8 
an increase in the profit tax rate ￿ = ￿ on the first-order conditions (2a') and (2b') is given by 















α − π π
− =
τ
 ￿       (5) 
Remarks 
An  increase  in  the  profit  tax  rate  ￿  does  not  alter  capital  choices  directly  but  reduces 
corruption,  unless  bribes  are  fully  tax  deductible.  The  higher  the  tax  rate,  the  lower  the 
relative costs of acquiring a given amount of permits legally. Since such costs are fully tax 
deductible, a tax rate increase raises the costs of bribes to a greater extent than expenditure of 
purchasing them legally, as long as bribes are not fully tax deductible. Hence, the incentives 
to acquire permits legally become stronger. This induces less corruption and the marginal 
costs of capital rise. As the resulting reduction in capital usage is conditional on the change in 
corruption, it will only occur if bribes are not fully tax deductible. 
The findings summarised in Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that there is either no or a negative - 
indirect - correlation between tax evasion and corruption. However, a direct impact of tax 
evasion activities on corruption activities is not discernible. 
 
4. Combating Corruption  
Section 3 has shown that the extent of corruption is independent of tax evasion activities. 
However, this independence is unidirectional in the basic model, unless bribes are fully tax 
deductible (￿ = 1), as the marginal gains from honesty - or costs of evasion - ￿h rise with the 
number of permits x purchased illegally (i.e. ￿hx > 0 for ￿ < 1). This increase in the marginal 
costs K' of evasion occurs because more bribes raise actual costs by the full amount of bribes 
while tax deductible costs only increase by a fraction ￿ < 1. Given the influence of corruption 
on tax evasion, it is analysed subsequently how parameters which are primarily intended to 
reduce corruption activities change corruption, capital and tax evasion.  
First, a reduction in the measure of the tax deductibility ￿ of the costs of purchasing permits 
illegally is investigated. While the explicit costs of domestic bribes have generally not been 
tax deductible, this was not necessarily true for bribes paid abroad. Only recently the OECD's 
anti-bribery  convention  required  signatory  countries  to  make  bribes  to  foreign  officials  a 
criminal  offence.  The  legislative  changes  resulting  from  the  OECD's  convention  can, 
therefore, be interpreted as a reduction in the measure of tax deductibility ￿. Moreover, the   9 
costs of purchasing permits do not only result from explicit bribes, as the choice of words in 
the present context may suggest. The 'bribe' can also contain the costs of legal advice, regular 
business expenses incurred in the course of purchasing permits or the costs of activities aimed 
at hiding corruptive behaviour. Such costs are often fully tax deductible since they are hard to 
distinguish from similar expenses incurred while pursuing legal objectives. A reduction in the 
measure of tax deductibility ￿ can, thus, also be interpreted as a more extensive definition of 
expenses due to corruption activities which are not tax deductible. Second, an increase in unit 
costs b of purchasing permits is analysed. These costs can go up, for example, if the fine 
imposed on risk-averse bureaucrats for accepting bribes, the probability of being punished or 
their wages rise, implying a  reduction in the  net  gain  from accepting  a bribe of a given 
magnitude. As a consequence, the bribe b will grow, since the 'supply curve' for illegally 
obtained permits shifts upwards. Third, corruption can be combated indirectly by reducing the 
number  of  permits  per  unit  of  capital  p(k)  required  for  production.  As  an  alternative - 
respectively in addition - a fall in the number of permits per unit of capital at the margin p'(k) 
can be considered. These policy measures reduce the regulatory requirements and, hence, the 
need for corruptive activities.
 6 
The impact of a reduction in the tax deductibility ￿ of the costs of purchasing permits illegally 
is summarised in: 
Proposition 3 
A reduction in the tax deductibility of the costs of permits purchased illegally lowers capital 
input and corruption. The effect on tax evasion is ambiguous, unless an initial situation of full 
deductibility (￿ = 1) is considered, in which case tax evasion declines. 
Proof: The impact of an increase in ￿ on (2a') to (2c') is given by ￿k￿ = 0, ￿x￿ = b￿ > 0, ￿h￿ = 
-K''￿bx* < 0. Using ￿kk, ￿hh < 0, ￿kx > 0, ￿hx ￿ 0, the results enumerated subsequent to 
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6 Finally, a change in tax rates could be analysed. However, the impact of tax rate variations on evasion activities 
depends crucially on whether the costs of evasion are a function of evaded taxes or undeclared income (cf. 
footnote 4). Therefore, any correlation between tax evasion and corruption owing to tax rate changes is model-
specific and will not be looked at further.   10 
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The term in square brackets in (6b) is positive, unless ￿ = 1 applies (cf. equation (2b')), while 
the last term is unambiguously positive and deducted. If ￿ = 1, dh*/d￿ < 0 will hold as C' = b. 
Since a decrease in ￿ is looked at, h* rises and tax evasion declines. ￿ 
Remarks 
If (illegally) purchasing a permit reduces the tax burden by less than before the change in 
policy  (because  ￿  declines),  the  costs  of  corruption  will  rise  and  fewer  permits  will  be 
acquired  illegally.  The  decline  in  x*  raises  the  marginal  costs  of  obtaining  the  required 
number of permits officially C'(p(k*) – x*), given C'' > 0, and, thereby, also the marginal 
costs of capital. Optimal capital usage declines.  
The effect of a reduction in the tax deductibility of bribes on tax evasion is twofold: first, the 
marginal costs of tax evasion K' rise with a decline in ￿, as ￿h￿ < 0 indicates. This c. p. 
reduces evasion. The first-order condition (2b') shows that, second, the marginal costs of 
bribery rise, because the effective tax rate on permits purchased illegally goes up. Fewer 
bribes, however, lower the costs of tax evasion which c. p. increases. The marginal cost effect 
of a  variation  in the tax deductibility is due to  differential effective tax rates on  permits 
purchased illegally (1 - ￿￿) and on the costs of acquiring permits legally (1 - ￿). Accordingly, 
the  marginal  cost  effect  will  not  arise  if  effective  tax  rates  are  identical,  that  is  if  full 
deductibility is assumed.  
The impact of a higher bribe b on capital input, tax evasion and corruption is summarised as: 
Proposition 4 
A higher bribe b reduces capital input and corruption. Tax evasion always rises for ￿ ￿ h*. 
Proof: The consequences of an increase in b on the first-order conditions (2a') to (2c') are 
given by ￿kb = 0, ￿xb = -(1 - ￿￿) < 0, ￿hb = - K''￿x*(￿ - h*) . Since ￿kk, ￿hh < 0, ￿hx ￿ 0, ￿kx 
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Remarks 
A higher bribe has no direct impact on the costs of capital. However, purchasing permits 
illegally becomes more expensive and, hence, fewer bribes are paid. Since less corruption 
raises the marginal costs of capital, capital input declines. The direct effect of bribes on tax 
evasion is uncertain, since the marginal gain of declaring profits to tax authorities, i.e. the 
marginal costs of evasion, will only fall with a greater expenditure for bribes if ￿ > h* holds. 
In such a situation, taxable income declines by more than the amount of taxes evaded. Given a 
fall in the gain from tax honesty, declared income is reduced and evasion rises. Apart from 
this direct effect, the decline in the number of permits purchased illegally lowers undeclared 
income  and  the  marginal  gain  from  honest  tax  declarations  K'.  This  indirect  impact 
unambiguously raises tax evasion. Since the direct and the indirect consequences cannot be 
compared  quantitatively,  the  relationship  between  bribes  and  tax  evasion  will  be  an 
unambiguously positive one only if the two effects do not work in opposite directions. 
Finally, the government may reduce the scope for corruption by cutting down the number of 
permits p(k) required per unit of capital and/or the number of permits needed for an additional 
unit of capital p'(k). The respective findings for such a policy are summed up in: 
Proposition 5 
(1) A decrease in the absolute number of permits required does not alter capital input, but 
lowers corruption and also tax evasion if ￿ > h*, for a given marginal number p'(k) of permits.  
(2) A decrease in the number of permits required for an additional unit of capital raises capital 
input  and  alters  neither  corruption  nor  tax  evasion,  for  a  given  absolute  number  p(k)  of 
permits.  
(3) A combined reduction in the absolute and marginal number of permits required raises 
capital input and lowers corruption and also tax evasion if ￿ > h*. 
Proof: The effects of an increase in p(k) (p'(k)) on the first-order conditions (2a') to (2c'), for a 
constant marginal (absolute) number of permits p'(k) (p(k)) required, are given by ￿kp = -C''p' 
< 0, ￿xp = C''(1 - ￿) > 0, ￿hp = -K''￿C'(1 - h*) < 0, ￿kp' = -C' < 0, ￿xp' = ￿hp' = 0. As ￿xx, ￿hh 
< 0, ￿hx ￿ 0, ￿kx > 0, ￿xk = 0 and ￿kk = R'' - C'p'' for dp(k) = 0, and ￿kk = R'' - C''(p')2 for 
dp'(k) = 0, the changes in k*, x*, and h* are given by dk*/dp = dx*/dp' = dh*/dp' = 0 and: 
0
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where D(dp'(k) = 0) := - ￿hhR''C''(1 - ￿) < 0 and D(dp(k) = 0) := - ￿hh(R'' - C'p'')C''(1 - ￿) < 0. 
Combining a fall in the absolute and marginal number of permits required p(k) and p'(k) 
results in more capital input, since dk*/dp(k) + dk*/dp'(k) < 0. The results for tax evasion and 
corruption can be determined in analogy. ￿ 
Remarks 
Inspection of the first-order conditions (2a') to (2c') reveals that a decline in the number of 
permits  required  p(k),  holding  constant  the  marginal  prerequisite,  reduces  the  costs  of 
obtaining an additional permit legally C'(p(k*) - x*), which are determined by the first-order 
condition for the optimal selection of bribes (2b'). This is the case because the net-of-tax 
marginal costs of purchasing permits are constant, given optimal evasion choices. Thus, also 
the marginal gain must be constant. Accordingly, any fall in the number of permits required 
p(k) has to be compensated by a reduction in the number of permits x* obtained illegally of 
exactly  the  same  magnitude.  Corruption  declines.  However,  if  the  number  of  permits 
purchased illegally is reduced by exactly the same extent as the number of permits required 
has fallen, marginal costs of capital will remain unaffected and capital input will not vary. 
Finally, constant costs of capital C(p(k*) - x*) - rk* and fewer permits purchased illegally 
imply a greater undeclared tax base (R(k*) - C(p(k*) - x*))(1 - h*) - bx*(￿ - h*) for ￿ > h*, 
entailing a larger gain from truthful declarations. Hence, tax evasion will fall if ￿ > h*. 
A decrease in the marginal number of permits required p'(k*) lowers the marginal costs of 
capital and raises capital input. The first-order conditions for the choice of tax evasion and 
corruption activities are independent of p'(k). Since the absolute number of permits is held 
constant by assumption, tax evasion and corruption do not change.  
The  findings  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  Corruption  can  be  diminished  if  the  tax 
deductibility of bribes is reduced, the costs of acquiring a permit illegally are raised, or the 
number of permits required for production is lowered. With the exception of a reduction in the 
number of permits required, which also lowers tax evasion (for ￿ > h*), all other policy 
measures  which  reduce  corruption  either  affect  tax  evasion  in  an  ambiguous  manner  or   13 
actually raise it. Policies to fight corruption are, thus, no suitable instruments to raise the 
fraction of the tax base declared to tax authorities in the framework under consideration.
7  
This evaluation will be strengthened further if the impact of anti-corruption policies on the 
government  budget  is  taken  into  account.  Higher  costs  of  purchasing  permits  illegally 
decrease the tax base, while a reduced tax deductibility of bribes and fewer permits required 
for production raise the tax base. In addition, the amount of taxes evaded varies, often in an 
uncertain direction. Finally, anti-corruption policies are unlikely to be costless, so that the 
impact  of  such  policy  measures  on  the  government's  budget cannot  be  predicted  without 
making further assumptions with respect, for example, to the measure of tax deductibility of 
bribes ￿ or the costs of anti-corruption policies.
8 Therefore, the change in the tax rate which 
warrants  a  balanced  budget  cannot  be  ascertained  either  and  incorporating  the  budgetary 
effects of anti-corruption policies into the analysis of combating corruption in the presence of 
tax evasion aggravates the uncertainty regarding this relationship. 
 
5. Alternative Objectives 
In the analysis of tax evasion behaviour it has been shown that some findings are sensitive to 
the  exact  specifications  of  the  evasion  technology  and  the  'cost  of  evasion'  function.
9 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005), for example, demonstrate that the comparative static 
effects in a model of income tax evasion will become ambiguous if individuals have multiple 
modes of evading taxes, such as under-declaring gross income and overstating deductions. To 
investigate the robustness of the findings  obtained thus  far,  suppose, first, that  firms can 
declare differential fractions or multiples of the true tax bases for net revenues R(k), the costs 
of permits C(p(k) - x) and bribe payments bx. Let the degree of truthful declaration of net 
revenues  R(k)  be  denoted  by  hR,  of  the  costs  of  permits  by  hC  and  of  bribes  by  hB. 
Differential choices can be beneficial for the firm if the 'cost of evasion' functions differ for 
the alternatives means of evading taxes. These cost functions are denoted by KR, KC, and 
                                                
7 This result is based on an optimal choice of evasion activities. As an anonymous referee has pointed out, this 
assumption is not innocuous, as the firm may be obliged to hide part of the profit from corruption and to evade 
more taxes than it would do in the absence of corruptive activities. If the measure of profit declarations is limited 
to  h   ￿  h*,  any  statement  about  the  correlation  between  corruption  and  tax  evasion  will  depend  on  the 
assumptions with respect to the determinants of  h . A setting in which tax evasion is restricted, thus allows for 
even less of a prediction about the link between the two types of illegal activities than a framework with optimal 
choices. 
8 Since profits are taxed and because capital input and corruption activities are chosen optimally, variations in 
capital and corruption have no first-order tax base impact. 
9 The investigation of the subsequent modifications has been suggested by the anonymous referees to whom I am 
extremely grateful for pointing out the insights of these extensions.    14 
KB, and exhibit the same features as the function K, i.e. Ki', Ki'' > 0 for i = R, C, B. In such a 
setting, the firm's objective is given by: 
() ) R h 1 )( k ( R R K ) k ( R ) R h 1 ( ) B h , C h , R h , x , k ( − τ − τ − = + π       
     ( ) ) 1 C h )]( x ) k ( p ( C [ C K ) x ) k ( p ( C ) C h 1 ( − − τ − − τ − −     
            ( ) ) B h ( bx B K bx ) B h 1 ( α − τ − τ − −        (1+) 
Second,  it  can  be  hypothesised  that  the  true  tax  basis  of  firms  is  not  affected  by  bribe 
payments, so that the 'cost of evasion' function K is independent of the extent of corruption. 
This specification is based on the notion that the tax authorities are aware of the costs of 
attaining permits legally and that bribes, therefore, do not reduce the tax base. If the firm 
chooses the share h of profits declared to tax authorities in such a setting, its objective will be: 
() ) h 1 )]( k ( p ( C ) k ( R [ K )] k ( p ( C ) k ( R [ h bx ) x ) k ( p ( C ) k ( R ) h , x , k ( − − τ − − τ − − − − = + + π  
 (1++) 
Focussing initially on the framework with multiple ways of evading taxes, assume that the 
firm  can  declare  each  tax  base  separately.  Maximising  ￿+  with  respect  to  capital  k,  the 
number of permits x purchased illegally, and hi, i = R, C, B, then yields (2a') and (2b') as first-
order conditions as well as: 
0 )] R h 1 )( k ( R [ ' R K 1 : R h = − τ + − = π        (2c+) 
0 )] 1 C h )( x ) k ( p ( C [ ' C K 1 : C h = − − τ − = π        (2d+) 
0 )] B h ( bx [ ' B K 1 : B h = α − τ − = π       (2e+) 
Optimal interior choices of tax declarations imply 0 < hR* < 1, hC* > 1 and hB* > ￿. Such 
interior solutions are assumed for the subsequent exposition.
10 In this modified framework, 
Proposition 1 and all findings of the basic model with respect to the optimal choice of capital 
k* and the number of permits x* acquired illegally, as summarised in Propositions 2 to 5, 
continue to hold. This is due to the separability of capital and corruption activities on the one 
hand and tax evasion choices on the other hand (cf. Proposition 1). However, tax evasion 
                                                
10 Proofs of the results of this section are relegated to Appendix 2. If bribes were not tax deductible, this would 
imply ￿ = 0 and in the case of separate declarations also hB = 0 as tax evasion would otherwise immediately be 
recognised.   15 
decisions are not separable from the amount of capital used and the extent of corruption. The 
consequences of variations in exogenous variables on the various modes of tax evasion are 
summarised in table 1: 
Table 1:   
Direction of Change in Tax Base Declarations Due to an Increase in an Exogenous Variable 
  ￿ b  p(k) (dp'(k) = 0)  p'(k) (dp(k) = 0) 
hR*  > 0  < 0  0  < 0 
hC* < 0  > 0  0 > 0 
hB* ?  ?  < 0  = 0 
 
A  decrease  in  the  tax  deductibility  ￿  of  bribes  lowers  capital  input  and  corruption  (cf. 
Proposition 3). Moreover, from equation (6a) it can be derived that p(k) - x declines with a 
fall in ￿. The first-order conditions (2c+) and (2d+) then immediately reveal that the optimal 
fraction hR* of net revenues R(k) declared to tax authorities falls with a decline in ￿, whereas 
the  over-declaration  hC*  of  the  costs  of  permits  C(p(k) - x)  rises.  The  impact  on  the 
declaration of bribes is uncertain - indicated by the question mark in table 1 -, as inspection of 
(2e+) reveals. This is the case as the decline in the number of permits x acquired illegally and 
the measure of tax deductibility ￿ have opposite effects on the optimal declaration hB*. The 
intuition for the effects of a higher bribe b is the same, as it also reduces capital input and 
corruption (cf. Proposition 4).  
A  reduction  in  the  absolute  number  p(k)  of  permits  required  for  production,  for  a  given 
requirement  per  additional  unit  of  capital  p'(k),  does  not  alter  capital  input  and  lowers 
corruption  to  an  extent  so  that  the  costs  C(p(k) - x)  of  obtaining  permits  legally  remain 
constant (cf. Proposition 5(1)). Accordingly, neither the fraction hR* of net revenues R(k) nor 
the over-declaration hC* of the costs of obtaining permits legally change with a variation in 
the number of permits required (cf. equations (2c+) and (2d+)). However, less corruption 
reduces the costs of an over-declaration of bribe expenditure and the over-declaration rises. 
All three effects in combination imply a rise in tax evasion owing to a fall in the number of 
permits required. Finally, a lower number of permits p'(k) required for an additional unit of 
capital, for a given absolute requirement p(k), raises capital input and does not affect the 
optimal  amount  of  corruption  (cf.  Proposition  5(2)).  If  the  extent  of  corruption  remains   16 
constant, the incentives to over-declare bribes will be the same. Accordingly, hB* does not 
change.  Greater  capital  usage  raises  the  costs  of  insufficient  revenue  declarations  and, 
therefore, hR* increases with a decline in p'(k). Higher costs C(p(k) - x) of acquiring permits 
legally decrease the incentives to over-declare these costs, and hC* falls. Thus, a reduction in 
the number of permits required per additional unit of capital restricts tax evasion. A combined 
decline  in  the  absolute  and  marginal  number  of  permits  has  an  ambiguous  effect  on  tax 
evasion. 
The above analysis clarifies that the effects of changes in the tax deductibility of bribes, the 
level  of  bribes and  the  regulatory  environment  on  capital and corruption  choices  are  not 
altered by the existence of multiple modes of tax evasion. However, the impact of variations 
in these exogenous variables on tax evasion may either become uncertain or can also actually 
be reversed in comparison to a setting with a single evasion variable h, as it is the case for a 
higher number of permits required. 
Turning to the second alternative specification and maximising equation (1++) with respect to 
capital k, the number of permits x purchased illegally, and the share of profits h declared to 
tax authorities, yields: 
[ ] 0 ) k ( ' p )) k ( p ( ' C ) x ) k ( p ( ' C ) 1 )( k ( ' R : k = τ − − − τ − = π      (2a++) 
0 b ) x ) k ( p ( ' C : x = − − = π        (2b++) 
{ } 0 )] h 1 ( )) k ( p ( C ) k ( R [ ' K 1 : h = − − τ + − = π        (2c++) 
Note  that  an  interior  solution  for  the  tax  evasion  problem  will  be  warranted  only  if  net 
revenues R(k) exceed the costs C(p(k)) of acquiring all permits legally. Since p'(k), R'(k) > 0, 
an interior solution for the choice of capital k implies that the term in square brackets in 
(2a++) is positive, [C'(p(k) - x) - C'(p(k)￿] > 0. Further inspection of the first-order conditions 
shows that the optimal levels of capital input and corruption are independent of tax evasion 
activities. Therefore, Proposition 1 holds in this modified framework as well. However, in 
contrast to the basic model of Section 2, tax evasion is not independent of capital choices, as 
￿K'/￿k* > 0. Moreover, capital and corruption unambiguously fall with the tax rate, so that the 
findings summarised in Proposition 2 apply without the restriction on the tax deductibility of 
bribes.
11  In  addition,  a  higher  bribe  b  reduces  optimal  capital  input  k*,  the  measure  of 
corruption  x*  and  raises  tax  evasion  since  dh*/db  <  0.  Comparing  these  findings  with 
                                                
11 Obviously, no statement about the impact of a change in the tax deductibility of bribes (cf. Proposition 3) is 
feasible, since it does not play a role in the modified setting.   17 
Proposition 4 illustrates that the alteration of the analytical framework does not affect the 
consequences for capital and corruption choices and strengthens the prediction with respect to 
tax evasion since the decrease in h* no longer depends on the degree of tax deductibility. 
Finally, a decrease in the absolute number p(k) of permits required lowers capital input and 
corruption, and has uncertain consequences for the extent of tax evasion. A reduction in the 
number  of  permits  p'(k)  required  for  an  additional  unit  of  capital  raises  capital  input, 
corruption and tax evasion. Hence, the consequences of a combined fall in the absolute and 
marginal number of permits cannot be ascertained. 
In comparison to the basic model of Section 2, the restrictions on the tax deductibility of 
bribes are not required to sign the consequences of an increase in the bribe b on tax evasion, 
and of a rise in the tax rate on capital and corruption choices. This is the case since bribe 
payments do not affect the costs of tax evasion K, for given choices of capital k. Moreover, 
optimal capital, corruption, and tax evasion choices generally vary in the modified model with 
a change in the absolute and marginal number of permits required, relative to the framework 
of Section 2. These changes are caused by the assumption that the costs of obtaining permits 
legally  differ  according  to  whether  they  affect  gross  profits  (C(p(k) - x))  or  the  tax  base 
(C(p(k))). Since these costs - and also marginal costs - are higher in terms of their impact on 
the tax base, as C(p(k)) > C(p(k) - x) > 0 and C'(p(k) - x) - C'(p(k)￿ > 0, the incentives to 
evade taxes will be reduced, relative to the basic model of Section 2, if the number of permits 
p(k) required falls.  
The analysis of the two extensions of the model proposed in Section 2 has illustrated that the 
impact of tax evasion on capital and corruption choices is basically unaffected by alternative 
assumptions regarding tax evasion technologies. However, the impact of variations in those 
exogenous  variables  which  are  primarily  intended  to  lower  corruption  on  tax  evasion 
behaviour may change. Accordingly, the nature of the relationship between tax evasion and 
corruption may be altered by the modifications. In general, however, an indirect link between 
the two types of illegal activities continues to exist. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
What  is  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  tax  evasion?  Are  countries  plagued  by 
corruption also characterised by more tax evasion activities, or is the linkage an inverse one? 
Do policies combating one type of illegal behaviour induce a substitution process towards the 
other kind of illegal activity or do they generate a sort of double dividend in that both types of   18 
unlawful  activities  are  reduced?  With  the  exception  of  fiscal  corruption,  the  economic 
incentives which could provide an answer to these questions and a foundation for any kind of 
systematic relationship between corruption and tax evasion have not been looked at carefully 
yet. The present paper aims to fill part of the gap in the theoretical literature. 
To analyse the relationship between corruption and corporate tax evasion, it has been assumed 
that  production  requires  two  complementary  inputs.  One  input,  labelled  capital,  can  be 
purchased on a competitive market. The other input, labelled permits, has to be obtained from 
a corrupt government agency. Firms can decide on the amount of permits which they acquire 
legally and, thereby also on the amount of permits purchased illegally. Moreover, firms can 
decide on the amount of taxes which they pay. Taking the number of permits bought illegally 
as an indicator of corruption, it can be shown that the opportunity to evade taxes does not 
affect  the  optimal  amount  of  corruption,  for  a  given  tax  rate.  However,  in  an  economy 
characterised by tax evasion, the tax rate has to be higher in order to generate the same tax 
revenues  than  in  an  economy  without  tax  evasion.  Since  higher  tax  rates  tend  to  reduce 
corruption, this suggests a  negative  relationship  between  corruption and  tax  evasion. The 
analysis of variations in exogenous determinants of tax evasion and corruption, such as the tax 
deductibility of the costs of purchasing permits illegally, the level of the bribe payment or the 
number of permits required for production do not confirm this conjecture since any kind of 
relationship between the two types of criminal activities is feasible. Therefore, corruption and 
tax evasion are neither obvious substitutes nor clear-cut complements in the 'production' of 
profits. A uni-directional relationship between profit tax evasion and bureaucratic corruption 
can, thus, not be determined. This finding for the basic model has been confirmed by the 
analysis of the extensions in Section 5. In how far this result generalises to other forms of 
corruption and the evasion of other taxes remains an objective for future research.   19 
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7. Appendix 
7.1. Profit-maximum 
Taking into account ￿kx = C''p' > 0, ￿xx = - C''(1 - ￿) = -￿xk/p' < 0, ￿kk = R'' - C''(p')2 - C'p'' < 
0,  and  ( ) 0 bx C R ' ' K hh < − − τ − = π ,  the  (value  of  the)  determinant  D  of  equation  (3)  is 
negative,  as  0 ) 1 ( ' ' C ] ' ' p ' C ' ' R [ hh hh xk kx hh xx kk D < τ − − π − = π π π − π π π = .  Accordingly,  
0 < h* < 1, k*, x* > 0, constitute a unique after-tax profit maximum.  
 
7.2. Alternative Objectives (Section 5) 
If  the  firm's  objective  is  given  by  equation  (1+),  totally  differentiating  the  first-order 
conditions (2a'), (2b') and (2c+) to (2e+) with respect to all endogenous variables k, x, hR, hC, 
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   (A.1) 
The derivatives ￿kk, ￿kx, ￿xk, ￿xx, ￿k￿, ￿kp, ￿kp', ￿x￿, ￿xb, ￿xp, ￿xp' are given in the main 
text or in Appendix 1. Moreover, from (2c+) to (2e+) we obtain: 
0 ) R h 1 )( k ( ' R ' ' R K k R h > − τ = π       (A.2) 
0 ) k ( R ' ' R K R h R h < τ − = π        (A.3) 
0 p C h ' p x C h ' p ) 1 C h ( ' p ' C ' ' C K k C h < π = π − = − τ − = π      (A.4) 
0 ) x ) k ( p ( C ' ' C K C h C h < − τ − = π       (A.5) 
x / b b B h ) B h ( b ' ' B K x B h π = α − τ − = π      (A.6) 
0 B h bx ' ' B K B h B h < α π − = τ − = π       (A.7) 
Applying Cramer's rule to (A.1), using (A.2) to (A.7), and simplifying yields the results for 
the changes in capital and corruption stated in Propositions 1 to 5, namely that dk*/d￿, dx*/d￿ 
￿ 0, dk*/db, dx*/db, dk*/dp' < 0, dk*/dp = dx*/dp' = 0, dk*/d￿, dx*/d￿, dx*/dp > 0, and the 
findings for the evasion variables summarised in table 1.   21 
If the firm's objective is given by equation (1++), the derivatives of the first-order conditions 
(2a++), (2b++), and (2c++) will be given by ￿kh = ￿xh = ￿hx = ￿x￿ = ￿kb = ￿xp' = ￿hp' = ￿hb 
= 0, ￿xb = -1 and: 
[] [ ] )) k ( p ( ' C ) x ) k ( p ( ' C ) k ( ' ' p )) k ( p ( ' ' C ) x ) k ( p ( ' ' C 2 )) k ( ' p ( ) 1 )( k ( ' ' R kk τ − − − τ − − − τ − = π  
(A.8) 
0 ) k ( ' p ) x ) k ( p ( ' ' C xk kx > − = π = π       (A.9) 
0 xp ) x ) k ( p ( ' ' C xx < π − = − − = π       (A.10) 
))) k ( p ( C ) k ( R ( ' ' K hh − τ − = π < 0         (A.11) 
0 ) h 1 ))( k ( ' p )) k ( p ( ' C ) k ( ' R ( ' ' K hk > − − τ = π      (A.12) 
0 )) k ( ' p )) k ( p ( ' C ) k ( ' R ( k < − − = τ π       (A.13) 
0 ))) k ( p ( C ) k ( R ( ' ' K h > − = τ π       (A.14) 
) k ( ' p )) k ( p ( ' ' C ) k ( ' p ) x ) k ( p ( ' ' C kp τ + − − = π      (A.15) 
0 ) h 1 ))( k ( p ( ' C ' ' K hp < − τ − = π          (A.16) 
0 )) k ( p ( ' C ) x ) k ( p ( ' C ' kp < τ + − − = π      (A.17) 
Note  from  (2a++)  that  an  interior  solution  implies  R'(k)  -  C'(p(k) - x)p'(k)  >  0,  R'(k)  - 
C'(p(k))p'(k) > 0, and C'(p(k) - x) - ￿C(p(k)) > 0, allowing to sign (A.12), (A.13) and (A.17). 
Employing the same methodology as it has been used in the computations for the basic model 
of Section 2 yields dk*/d￿, dk*/db, dk*/dp', dx*/d￿, dx*/db, dx*/dp', dh*/db < 0, dk*/dp, 
dh*/dp' > 0, and dx*/dp > 1, while dh*/dp cannot be signed. 
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